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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
OF VENNA DARLENE BERM, De-
ceased. EDWARD C. BERM, 
Protestant and Respondent, 
vs. 
ALMA GEE, personally, and as admin--
istrator of the Estate of V enna Dar-
lene Behm, Deceased, 
Appeltant. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7305 
This appeal is to determine to whom and· in what 
amounts distribution should be made of a sum recov·ered 
for the death of Venna Darlene Behm. ·Verma Darlene 
Behm died in childbirth at Salt Lake City, Utah, Febru-
ary 18, 1947, leaving surviving as her only heirs her hus-
band, Edward C. Behm,. the protestant and respondent 
here, and two baby daughters horn at their mother's 
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death. The deceased was the daughter of the appellant, 
Alma Gee. ( Tr. ·3, 4, 104). Following the death of Mrs. 
Behm and upon the petition of her husband and father, 
her father on April2:9, 1947, was appointed administrator 
for the purpose of bringing an action for negligence for 
the benefit of her heirs, her husband and two baby 
daughters, against a local physician. (Tr. 3, 4, 8). On 
the same day and upon the petition of her husband and 
father the father was also appointed guardian of the es-
tates. of the two minor daughters, File No. 2907·5, in the 
District Court of Salt Lake County, attached as an ex-
hibit in this case. Both petitions were dated and sworn 
to Ap·ril 11, 1947. In the petitions for appointment of 
administrator and guardian it was recited that the only 
estate of the decedent was a claim and action for negli-
gence against the doctor for her death, and that the only 
estates of the minors consisted of such a claim, and that 
it was the purpos:e of the administrator and guardian 
to bring an action or make a settlement on account of said 
death. 
Thereafter the administrator filed a complaint July 
28, 1947, against th·e doctor, in the District Court of 
Salt Lake County for the death of said ·decedent, recit-
ing that her only heirs were her husband, Edward c .. 
Be·hm, and two baby daughters, Venna Julene Behm and 
Cheryl Darlene Behm, and tha;t as the result of the negli-
gence of the defendant the aforesaid heirs had been 
damaged and asked for judgment by reason thereof, 
File No. 80962 in the District Court of Salt Lake County 
attached as an exhibit herein. As a result of this latter 
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action a settlen1ent 'Yith the defendant therein was ar-
rived at, and on January 7, 1948, the District Court of 
Salt Lake County authorized the administrator to make 
a settlement in the sum of $15,000.00 and to pay there-
from to his attorney, Shirley P. J·ones, th·e sum of $3,-
750.00, ''attorney's fee solely for services rendered in 
making and securing said settlement," (Tr. 14). At the 
same time the fath·er as guardian was also authorized 
to execute a release and satisfaction in full for any 
claims of said minors by reason of the death of the 
mother of said minors, (No. 29075). 
On April 28, 1947, the day before the ap·pointment 
of the guardian and administrator as aforesaid, the hus-
band, protestant and respondent here, executed a docu-
ment as follows, ("Tr. 19, 111, 112, Exhibit 6) : 
"IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF SALT L.AKE 
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
In the Matter of the Estate ) 
of ) 
\TENNA DARLENE BERM, ) ASSIGNMENT 
Deceased. ) 
Edward C. Behm, the husband of the above 
entitled deceased, for a valuable consideration and 
for the further consideration that .Alma Gee, the 
father of S'aid deceased, has instituted and will 
·continue to carry on further proceedings for the 
recovery for said estate of anything ·due it for 
the death of said deceased, and particularly any-
thing due the minor .children of the undersigned, 
·and the said deceased ·does hereby assign, trans-
fer and set over unto th·e said Alma Gee all his 
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right, title, claim and interest in and to the said 
,estate, the proceeds thereof, and particularly the 
proceeds of any recovery made or recovered from 
Von G. Holbrook, or any recovery made or recov-
ered for the death of said deceased. It is express-
ly understood that the said minor children shall 
receive th,eir full share of said estate free and 
clear of this assignment to be administrated under 
the guardianship proceedings heretofore insti-
tuted on th·eir behalf by the said Alma Gee with 
the consent of the undersigned. 
D·ated at Salt L:ake City, Utah, this 28th day 
of April, 1947. 
(Signed) EDWARD C. BERM, 
Edward C. Behm. 
Witness: (Signed) AMY C. GEE 
(Signed) JULENE GEE'' 
A draft for $15,000.00 was given in payment of the 
settlement, and this draft did not clear from collection 
until J anuaitr 28, 1948, ( Tr. 184). A couple of weeks 
after that and before any distribution could he made 
of the remainder of the settlement Mr. Behm, the hus-
band, and his attorney, Mr. Langlois, came to the, office 
of th·e administrator's a:ttorney. This was the first time 
th·ere had been any question of any controversy between 
the husband and the father concerning this matter. No 
question was ever raised by the husband until after the 
seittlement had been made. 
This controversy over the distribution of the money 
continued back and forth for a couple of weeks, (Tr. 184). 
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No satisfactory conclusion was arrived at, and on April 
23, 1948, the husband petitioned the District Court for 
an order to sho"" cause "~hy the $11,250.00 remaining 
from the settlement should not be distributed to himself 
and his t'vo minor daughters, (Tr. 15, 17). A citation was 
issued by the court for the administrator to show cause 
why he should not be required to disburse the $11,250.00 
to the heirs of the deceased and to show cause why the· 
court should not declare the foregoing ''Assignment'' 
of .A.pril 28 to be null and void and of no effect. The ad-
ministrator filed objections to the citation which were 
taken under advisement and overruled, (Tr. 28). The 
administrator then petitioned the court for distribution 
to himself by virtue of the said ''Assignment'' and to 
the said minors, or in the alternative that he be allowed 
a quantum men.:t for his services in the ·event. the other 
distribution should be denied, (Tr. 31). To this petition 
the husband, protestant here, filed objections alleging 
that he had paid the last illness and funeral expeng.es of 
his deceased wife in the sum of $1,652.00, and that- he had 
obligated himself to pay for th·e support and mainten-
ance of ~he minor children; that the ''·-Assignment'' from 
himself to his father-in-law, the administrator, was void, 
and asking the court to take into consideration his ·pay-
ment of these expenses, and ''that this court enter its 
order distributing said $11,250.00, together with interest 
to your protestant as the surviving husband of V enna 
Darlene Behm, deceased, and to Venna Julene Behm and 
Cheryl Darlene Behm, taking into consideration the phy-
sical condition and mental condition of said children, 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
and taking into consideration the expenditures heretofore 
rnade and obligations incurred by your peitioner. '' (Tr. 
41). 
To this objection of the huhsand, the administrator 
filed an answer, (Tr. 45), and a supplemental answer 
and reply setting forth that he, the father, had become 
administrator and guardian at the request of the pro-
testant and entered u.pon his duties and performed all 
of the same as required by the ''Assignment'', and had 
fully complied with all the things to be done by him all 
in relian0e upon the acts and conduct of the p-rotestant, 
and that the protestant is estopped to raise any ques-
tion as to the said ''Assignment'', except the issue of 
fraud and misrepre~sentation, (Tr. 52, 53). 
The matter came on for hearing. Th-e: findings, con-
clusions and judgm·ent of the court cover ten pages in 
the transcript and are too long to be set forth haec verba 
herein. The matters recited therein pertaining to the rec-
ord already appear in the· files and need no re·petition. 
The court round that the husband was grief-stricken all 
. during February, March and April of 1947, and that he 
had full confidenee, and trust in the father and ''told him 
to go ahead with arrangements for suit''; that during 
said period there wer-e discussions .betw·een the husband 
and father ·concerning a suit against the doctor, and that 
the father consulted various lawyers and ''proposed to 
the protestant that they go into a partnership· for the 
purpose of commencing suit against the doctor", (Tr. 
56) ; that the husband joined in the petition for appoint-
ment of guardian and administrator and read the same 
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in the office of Shirley P. Jones, the attorney for the 
administrator, and that: on Ap,ril 28, 1947, he, the hus-
band, at the home of the father signed the ''Assign-
nlent ", (Exhibit 6) ; that '~there was no consideration 
given Edward C. Behn1 by said Alma Gee for said 
assigmnent''; that Behm did not fully understand the 
import of the contents of the ''Assignment'', nor had 
he been fully and completely instructed as to his rights, 
''nor did Alma Gee at said time say anything concern-
ing the contents of said assignment to the protestant, 
nor attempt to explain said contents", ( Tr. 57). The 
findings further find that the father paid out certain 
expenses in connection with the administrator and guard-
ianship matters and the suit against the doctor; that 
after the $11,250.00 was paid to the father in the settle-
ment he deposited the same to his account as administra-
tor and thereafter withdrew the money, and later de-
posited it, then again on M-ay 13, 1948, withdrew it, and 
without authority or order of the court ''appropriated 
to his own use $750.00 of said money, and that upon orde·r 
of this court duly made during the trial of this cause, 
Alma Gee brought into court the sum of $10,500.00, which 
the court impounde,d and which is now in the custody of 
the Clerk of S:alt Lake County.'' The findings further 
relate that the protestant was not informed of the pro-
gress of the case nor the settlement, and that he dis-
covered that the settlement had been made in Dece·mher 
of 1947 or January, 1948 (Tr. 58, 59). The court found 
that "Alma Gee was not a credible witness on the trial 
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of this case, and finds that said Alma Gee fraudulently 
and wilfully attempted to conceal from the court the 
amount of money he had in his possession at the time 
of said hearing, and that the evidence given by the said 
Alma Gee in this hearing is not to be relied upon, * * * ", 
(Tr. 59). The Cou-rt· further found. that Edward C. 
Behm is emp~oyed and earns $25.00 a week as an ap-
. prentice architect, an additional $100.00 a month as pro-
ceeds from a loan and earns additional money as a 
musician ; ''that he has remarried, and that he does not 
now and never did need or desire any of the 1noney re-
covered ·on account of the death of his wife, and that, 
therefore, there is nothing to be assigned to Alma Gee 
by him under the terms and conditions of Exhibit 1, 
(Note: should be Exhibit 6), even were it valid and bind-
ing." (Tr. 60). ·The father attempted to have a judicial 
record made of the, fact that his ·children are physically 
and mentally arrested in their developm·ent which the 
court refused to find, (Tr. 60). 'The court found that 
$500.00 is a reasonable sum to be paid to C. Vernon 
Langlois and Ray S. McCarty for their services herein, 
(Tr. 60), and from such findings concluded that the 
cause of action for the death of Venna Darlene Behm 
vested immediately upon her death in her heirs, ''and 
that the recovery belonged to the heirs''; that the cause 
of action and the recovery for wrongful death was not 
assignable, and therefore Exhibit 1, (should be Exhibit 
6), ''the purported assignment of Edward C. Behm to 
Alma Gee, was void and of no effect'' ; that there was no 
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consideration for the said d .. A.ssignn1ent ", '~and said as-
signnlent "~as chan1perty and therefore void and of no 
effect "?ha tsoever ~ ', and '~that because of the fact that 
Ed\Ya.rd C. Behm does· not require or need any of the 
recovery, and because of the condition of arrested de-
velopment, pllriii~ulll~? t-uul HU~Rt~y, (stricken by the 
court) and the needs of the minor children, to-wit, Venna 
Julene Behm and Cheryl Darlene Behn1, the said Edward 
C. Behm is not entitled to any ordeT awarding him any 
part of said recovery." (Tr. 61). The court then found 
that the father administrator was not entitled to any 
share by reason of the said" Assignment", Exhibit 6, but 
that on account of his services and money exp·ended he 
'vas entitled to the $750.00, (which the court had s.aid he 
had obtained fraudulently ·and unlawfully), (Tr. 59, 60), 
and that he should ret~ the $750.00 unla~ully retained 
by him in full payment of his services; that the protest-
ant's attorneys were entitled to $500.00 for their services, 
and that the balance .of the $10,000.00 should b~ turned 
over to the guardian of the minors, $5,000.00 for each 
minor, "when said guardian has posted good and suffi-
cient bond for the protection of said minors, or to some 
reputable trust compa~y, if a trust company is substitu-
ted for the present guardian." (Tr. 62). The judgment 
followed the conclusions of law, (Tr. 63, 64). O·bjections 
were made to the proposed findings of fact ·at pages 66 to 
79 of the transcript. The findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and judgment were signed November 18, 1948 (Tr. 
64), and immediately on the same day an appeal there-
from was taken 'to this court, (Tr. 6-5). 
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THE GUARDIAN·SHIP MATTER 
The ink was hardly dry on the findings of fact, con-
clusions of law, and judgment until the husband, the 
protestant here, secured an order to show cause- dated 
November 19, 1948, why the father should not be removed 
as guardian and the First Security Trust Company ap-
pointed in his stead. This file is an exhibit here, the 
guardianship matter is in this court on appeal and will 
be separately presented. 
THE TESTIMONY 
At the hearing Shirley P. Jones of Salt Lake City 
and Lewis Larson of Manti app~eared as attorneys for 
the father administrator and Ray S. McCarty and C. 
Vernon Langlois of Salt Lake City appeared for the pro-
testant husband, (Tr. 99). Because he· expected to be a 
witness . for the administrator, Mr. Jones during the 
hearing attempted to withdraw as attorney in the matter. 
The trial court said that would not he necessary, but 
that Mr. Jones couldn't argue the evidence. to the~ court. 
Thereupon Mr. McC-arty stated that he was willing to 
have Mr. Jones argue the matte·r and that they would 
waive. any objection they might otherwise have under 
the cannon of ethics. ( Tr. 144, 145). Mr. Jones, therefore, 
is actively participating in this appeal. 
In support of his objections to the petition for 
distribution the p~rotestant testified that he· was very 
upset at the time of the death of his wife, and that at the 
hospital her father and mother stated that they were 
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going to sue the doctor and even threatened the doctor's 
life; that the funeral 'Yas about ·one '""eek later, ( Tr. 105) ; 
that he paid the funeral expenses and the doctor bill, 
for a monument for his wife and for services at the h·os-
pital for the "~ife and children totaling $1,652.10, includ-
ing .$100.00 to the doctor, (Tr. 106, 107 and Exhibits 1, 
2, 3, -1, 5). He testified that some time after the funeral 
of his wife he visited his wife's father, and that he told 
him at that time that if he, the father, wasn't going to 
sue, he, Behm, the husband, would "like to take it over". 
"Q. What did Mr. Gee tell you~ 
A. He said there would be no sens,e of two of us 
fighting the case, and I agreed with him to let 
him take it over." (T.108). 
That at that time he had no ill feelings towards Mr. 
Gee, the father, and that he had faith and confidence in 
him; that the next he heard about it was when he went 
up to Mr. Jones' office to sign some papers in regards 
to the guardianship matter to proceed with the case, 
and that it is his signature that appears on both the 
petition for appointment of Alma Gee as guardian and 
as administrator, (Tr. 109); that these papers were 
signed on the 11th of April, 1947, and that he called up 
Mr. Langlois and asked him if it was all right, and that 
nothing at that time was said about the "Assignment", 
(Tr. 110); Mr. Jones explained to him his guardianship 
rights, (Tr. 112), that a few days later at the Gee's (the 
deceased's father and mother) home he signed another 
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paper, (Tr. 110), which is the original "Assignment", 
Exhibit 6, (Tr. 111). 
''A. They called me up and said that they had 
forgotten one paper at the office that needed 
to be signed and if I would come down and 
sign it, and I went down to the house and 
read it over, and I read wh·ere it said that the 
children would get their share of it, ·am.d I was 
~assigning my share over I figured to them at 
the time. (Italics added.) 
Q. Did you at any time or at all intend to assign 
any of ·your share to Mr. Gee? 
A. I at no time knew that I had a share coming." 
(T. 112). 
That thereafter when he would ask how things were 
working out on the case the Gees would tell him it's 
working that's all, and it wasn't until the doctor's nurse 
told them of the settlement for $15,000.00 that he lmew 
about .it; that was when the doctor~s nurse kept calling 
him to pay an extra $100.00 to the dQGtor, (Tr. 114). 
When this was the witness finally decided. was Aprill, 
1948, (Tr. 118). The court found it was December, 1947, 
or January, 1948. (Tr. 59). When he found out about 
the settlement, he went to see Mr. Jones who told him 
that it was none of his business, that he· had nothing more 
to do with the cas.e. Mr. Jones never told him to put in 
a claim for the fune·ral, hos·pital or doctor's bills or that 
he had a claim for them, (Tr. 116); that he never re-
ceived any notice of the petition for p·ermission to settle 
the ·case against the doctor, (Tr. 118), nor did he know 
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that the 1natter can1e up in court for settlement, (Tr. 
119) . .~..t\t the time he signed the ''Assignment" Mr. Gee 
didn't giYe hin1 anything nor a copy of it, although Mr. 
Gee had three copies, (Tr. 119). 
On cross examination he stated that he was thirty 
years old; that h-e reads and writes the English language 
kno" ... s several attorneys in Salt Lake City, and that he 
would have pressed a claim against the doctor if his 
father-in-lR\Y didn't want to. 
"Q. Yes, but why was it that you didn't want 
to-
A. Because I was still ups·et. 
Q. -if he would~ 
A. This is only a month and a half after I lost 
my wife, and I was very upset, and I am 
still upset about it.'' (Tr. 120, 121). 
He signed Exhibit 6, he read it and he didn't talk to any-
one about it. (Tr. 122). He didn't talk to Mr. J·ones in 
his office about the "Assignlp.ent", (Tr. 123). He went 
up to Mr. Jones' office to sign the pap.ers. If Mr. Gee 
was going to fight the case, he wasn't going to, (Tr. 125). 
''Q. Well, whatever interest you had in the claim 
you assigned to Mr. Gee if he would do that, 
didn't you~ 
A. It looks that.way. 
Q. Yes ; and you read this assignment~ 
A. Yes sir. 
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Q. And you had a conversation about it with 
these p·eople ~ 
A. Y-es sir. 
Q. But you can't remember much about what 
was said? 
A. They at the house told me that they needed 
this one more paper signed that they had 
forgotten at the office and had to bring it 
down to the house for me to sign it." ( Tr. 126, 
127). 
At Mr. Gee's place on the 28th there were present Mr. 
and Mrs .. Gee and their daughter, Julene, who was about 
18 years of age. 
'' Q. Well, what was said in this conversation then 
down at Mr. Gee's place, if you remember? 
'A. ·That they were trying to get suit against the 
doctor and they ne·eded this paper to finish 
it up so they could start right on the case. 
Q. I see. 
A. That they couldn't do a thing without this 
paper being signed. 
Q. So then it was clear to you that they hadn't 
commenced any action, wasn't it1 
A. Yes sir.'' (Tr. 127, 128). 
On redirect examination he stated that he called Mr. 
Langlois on the 11th of Ap-ril and read him the head-
lines, and Mr. Langlois said, '' That's all right. Sign it.'' 
There was no "Assignment" handed to him that day. 
He doesn't know whether Mr. Jones was there when he 
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"ras talking to ~{r. Langlois, but it was in Mr. Jones' 
office, (Tr. 129). 
The children were kept in the hospital a month and 
a half after their birth, and they have been with his 
mother ever since, (Tr. 130). Exhibit 11 was introduced 
for the purpose of showing the physical condition of the 
children. Exhibit 11 reads: 
November 2, 1948 
J ulene Behm, 20 months of age, is less well 
developed than her twin Darlene Behm; therefore 
she will need more home care as well as medical 
care. 
Signed, 
Spencer Snow, M.D. (Tr. 170). 
As to the condition of the children, the witness said one 
of them was retarded. 
''Q. What~ 
A. Retarded. 
Q. Both~ 
A. Only the one is wors·e, yes.'' ( Tr. 171). 
That his salary is $25.00 a week as an architectural 
draftsman; that he is going to school under the G. I. Bill; 
that he is married at the present time, was remarried 
August 27, 1948; that his mother had the children until 
about a week ago; that he gets about $100.00 a month in 
addition from a loan he has out; that he gets about $25.00 
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a week playing for a dance orchestra, (Tr. 171, 173); 
that he collected $11,000.00 or $12,000.00 from the rail-
road company in February, 1947; that he is ,perfectly 
able to support his children, and that he has the earning 
capacity to do so, (Tr. 173, 174). 
The protestant's mother, Mrs. Elvina Behm, testi-
fied that she had had the babies with her at her home 
since they were six weeks old until last Tuesday. The 
case was heard Wednesday, N ovemher 3, so last Tues-
day would he the day before the hearing. She stated that 
Darlene is not like an average baby, not like my children. 
;She is just beginning to walk, and she is nearly 21 months 
old, and she can't feed herself, and ·can't talk. The other 
one can't sit up alone and can't stand and has no control 
over her body. She is less developed than the other. (Tr. 
176). 
The protestant called the appellant administrator, 
Mr. Gee, as his witness and develop~ed what the record 
already shows, that he had filed $100.00 bonds as required 
by the court; that he received $11,250.00 from Mr. Jones; 
that the money was at his house in cur~ency; that Mr. 
Jones deposited the draft given in settlement of the 
ease in the First National Bank and issued the witness 
a check which he, the witness, had deposited in the Con-
tinental National Bank; that he later withdrew it from 
the Continental National Bank upon the advice of his 
attorney, Mr. Lewis Larson, who told him it wasn't safe 
in the hank because it might he garnisheed by the pro-
testant, his son-in-law, who had already told him that he, 
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the witness, 'vas going to have trouble, (Tr. 131, 137). 
After he took the money from the bank, he put it back 
again and then drew it out again. He paid $200.00 to 
~Ir. Larson who had told him that he, Mr. Larson, 
thought it best to take it out of the bank. The witness 
stated that he didn't know how much he had spent, but 
he could tell at the noon recess. Upon questioning by 
the court he stated that he didn't think he could bring 
in $11,250.00 at 2 :00. Thereupon the court re~essed until 
2 :00 with directions to the witness to bring the money 
into court at 2:00, (Tr. 137, 140). At 2:00 the witness 
produced $7,500.00 which he said was for the babies 
which was deposited with the Clerk, (Tr. 143). Later in 
his testimony he stated that in addition. to the $200.00 
he had given ~Ir. Larson he had spent $550.00, and he 
thereupon produced an additional $3,000.00 which was 
deposited_ with the Clerk, (Tr. 153). The witness 'vas 
questioned about the dates of dep-osit and withdrawal. 
rhe bank's statement of his account was received iJJ 
evidence, . Exhibits 8 . and 10, and they show deposits 
totaling $11,250.00 January 28, 1948, the_ day he received 
the $11,250.00 from Mr. Jones shown by Exhibit 9; that 
on May 7, 1948, all of the money was drawn out except 
$1.00, redeposited May -13, 1948, and drawn out finally 
in the full amount of $11,250.00 on June 30, 1948. Part 
of the money was on deposit as federal insured savings, 
hut the bank will only take $5,000.00, that way so the rest 
'vas in a gene~al account in his name as administrator, 
(Tr. 147). It was after the citation to appear April 28, 
1948, that he withdrew the money the last time June 30, 
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1948, on the advice of Mr. Larson; (Tr. 148) that he drew 
it out: 
''Because I didn't want this man to get hold 
of that money and plunge it for every wildcat 
there was in this town. When my daughter died, 
she didn't have a place to live in. She had to come 
to my I)lace. !She didn't have a house to live in 
with any heat. She was pregnant with these two 
children, with them twins. 'She had to come to my 
hous;e and get warm and live there and stay there, 
and she says, 'I haven't had anything to eat for 
three days but bread and gravy.' I said, 'You 
come in and eat all you want.' '' 
"MR. McCARTY: I ask that-
A. That's the reason I took that money out, 
and he got $11,500.00 in cash from the rail-
road in a week after my daughter died, and 
then he comes and squandered it for ·every 
fool thing there was around here; bought 
automobiles; bought picture show machines; 
went to Mexico on a trip; went to Yellowstone 
Park. That is the reason I am holding· onto 
this money, because I hope them babies-" 
(Tr. 149, 150). 
That when his daughter went to the hospital they didn't 
have any money to pay the doctor bill. He advised her 
that he, the witness, would pay $100.00 of the doctor bill. 
They didn't have any coal in the house, and ''that's the 
reason I am holding on to it, and that's the reason I drew 
it out of the bank.'' ( Tr. 154). Answering questions from 
Mr. McCarty suggesting the answers he agreed that 
he knew that if the protestant., Behm, knew there was 
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a big sUin of n1oney a, .. ailable he 'votud want it, and that 
he would be reaching his hands out for it. He kne'v 
that from the beginning, and that he would be in there 
with both hands trying to get it. He asked Behm about 
the hospital bills, and Behm told him it 'vas $1600.00; 
whereas, it \Yas only $900.00 or $1,000.00. The witness 
has the figures from the hospital and the mortuary, and, 
w·hereas, Behm says his bills were $1600.00 they were 
less than $1,000.00. 
On his o'vn behalf the administrator, Mr. Gee, testi-
fied that when his daughter died he told the doctor he 
was going to sue for damages, and when he related this 
down at ~fr. Behm's home, "they jumped all over me." 
Down at Mr. Behm's home he was told, "you can't get 
anything out of a doctor'', and that he was a fool to 
even try it. 1\tfr. Behm, the husband, and his mother and 
others were there. It was right after the funeral. Mr. 
Behm came up to his p~ace several times and said, ''You 
can't get anything out of that doctor; no use for you to 
waste your time and money on it.'' This was right after 
his daughter died some time in March, 1947, (Tr. 200, 
201). He came to his place every two or three days. 
Some time in March of 1947 Behm ·came to see G·ee and 
asked Gee if he were going to sue that doctor. Gee 
said that he thought he would and Behm tried to change 
his mind on it. Behm said, ''They have got a fence around 
them with the law, and you can't get in." (Tr. 203). 
With reference to the ''Assignment'' the witness 
testified that over the telephone he told Behm he had 
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some papers to sign. Behm came to the witness's house 
about 8:00, and they sat .there and talked, and he said, 
''Where is thos.e papers for me to sign~'' The witness 
went to the drawer and got them and put them on the 
dining room table and Behm was going to sign them 
without reading them. The witness_ said, "You had 
better read them, Ed.'' Behm didn't think it was neces-
sary but finally read them over and said, "Oh, they're 
all right as far as I know." He signed them and he 
\vent away, "and so that's about all there was to that." 
( Tr. 204, 205) . 
It was stipulated that the testimony of Mrs. Gee 
and Miss Julene Gee would be in substance the same as 
the testimony of 1\ir. Gee, (Tr. 206, 207). The court 
allowed Mr. Behm $500.00 for his s.ervices in this matter 
to be paid to his attorneys, (Tr. 209). 
Mr. Jones, the· attorney for Mr. Gee, testified that 
not long after the death of V enna Darlene Behm Mr. 
Gee came to his office and discussed the action against 
the doctor; that on April 11, 1947, Mr. Behm came to 
his office with the Gees and signed the petition for 
ap·pointment of administrator and appointment of guard-
ian; (Tr. 179, 180). The witness told Behm that he and 
the two minor daughters were the heirs of Venna Dar-
lene Behm and the only one who could recover under 
the law and asked him why he didn't go ahead as ad-
ministrator and guardian, being the husband and father, 
and Behm said, ''I don't want anything to do with it.'' 
Mr. Jones told Behm, "If you sign these documents, 
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you authorize l\lr. Gee to take charge of the estate and 
to take charge of the property of the minors, and you 
are out," and he said, ''Yes, I understand that." ( Tr. 
182, 183). ~\_t that time it was stated by son1e one to 
Mr. Behm either by the witness or Mr. Gee that Mr. 
Gee \Yas not \Yilling to undertake all the responsibility 
unless there was some assignment to him in the case, 
and as a result of that conversation in the witness's 
office Exhibit 6, the "Assignment", was drawn. After 
the conversation was over, it was given to Mr. Gee to 
have Mr. Behm sign it. The_ witness took Mr. Behm in-
to Mr. Gordon Strong who was in his office and told 
Mr. Strong to notarjze the documents in the guardian-
ship and administration matter, introduced Mr. Behm, 
and told Mr. Strong, "This is the father of the babies 
in the Holbrook case-and the husband, and _he is sig~ing 
away his rights to his father-in-law, and I want you to 
notarize it." (Tr. 183). The witness never heard from 
or saw Behm until some time in· November or December 
after he had agreed on a settlement with the attorneys 
for the doctor. Then Behm came in with some state-
ment about some evidence that he had where he could 
get $100,000.00 from the doctor, and Mr. Jones told him, 
''This matter is going along· all right.'' · Behm said he 
was going to see the attorneys for the doctor, and the 
witness told him to stay away from the attorneys for 
the doctor, "you have nothing to do with this matter.-" 
B,ehm left, and the witness never saw him again until 
he came into the witness's office with Mr. Langlois 
after the settlement was made. After court approval 
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of the settlement, some days elapsed in order for the 
bank to send the draft for collection, and it was about 
the 28th of January, 1948, when the draft was cleare4 
and payment made to Mr. Gee, (Tr. 183, 184). The 
first time the witness ever heard that ther~ was any 
controversy between Behm and Gee was in February or 
March of 1948 after the settle·ment was made. No que~ 
tion was ever raised about the ''Assignment'' by Mr. 
Behm or any one else until after the settlement was 
made. The witness had only seen Behm three times, 
8.f5 above related, (Tr. 184). Behm was perfe~tly dis-
interested in what was being d9ne. 
"MR. McCARTY: Now, Mr. J one~, you treated 
this -as an estate, didn't you~ You gave no-
tice to creditors, didn't you~ 
A. To tell you the truth, Mr. McCarty, I never 
paid any attention to it. There was no con-
troversy. The only thing I wanted was to 
have administrator appointed and bring a 
lawsuit. Everybody that was in the thing was 
agreed on it." (Tr. 186) . 
..¢\.fter the settlement and before any distribution could 
be :p~ade to the guardian or any new bond secured for him, 
l3ehm came in with his objections. 
At the time of the petition for guardian and ad-
ministrator Behm was completely disinterested in the 
whole thing, and at that time it didn't app·ear that there 
would be any recovery, ( 'fr. 190). The witness thought 
tha,t if there was any recovery and Mr. Gee did all the 
work and carried all the responsibility he should be 
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protected. ..:-\.s to \Yhether there \vould be any recovery 
or not who could tell. The \VitnesB told Behm he was 
entitled to one-third of whatever \Vas recovered. The 
""i.tness interpreted the death statute and always has 
that the heirs share in the proportion that they are 
heirs, (Tr. 191, 192). The vvitness told Behn1 that he 
\\~as the one to carry on the proceedings, and Exhibit. 
6, the "..._-\..ssignment", wasn't prepared until after con-
ference on the 11th of April in witness's ·office. The 
witness was not concerned about .the distribution of the 
money, thought the heirs were entitled to it, and that 
an action should be brought against the doctor. The 
witness assumed that the statute not the witness took 
care of the distribution. If it hadn't been for Mr. Gee, 
there wouldn't have been anything in this case. He 
was deeply interested in the welfare of the babies and 
they never would have gotten a cent if it hadn't been 
for him, and they would have had their money long 
ago if it hadn't been for their father, the protestant 
here, (Tr. 192, 195). Mr. Gee is a highly proper person 
to have charge of this matter, ''He was the only one 
manifesting any interest in the babies at all.'' In all 
these proceedings Mr. and Mrs. Gee spent hours and 
days in assisting in the preparation of the proceedings. 
It took several months to prepare the case against the 
doctor, and it was essential that every detail be worked 
out thoroughly. Mr. and Mrs. Gee were the ones who 
detern1ined whether or not the settlement would be ac-
cepted, and they did so after thoroughly considering 
the rights of the babies, and there "\vould have been no 
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lawsuit and no recovery at all except for them, (Tr. 
195, 197). No one ever had any idea that there would 
be any controversy with Behm about this matter. The 
G-ees were the only ones who rendered the witness any 
assistance whatever to ascertain the .facts necessary to 
bring the -action against the ·doctor. Behm was never 
notified of the settlement as he had already indicated 
that he had no interest in it and was out of it, (Tr. 199). 
The protestant offered no evidence in rebuttal of 
the testimony of Mr. Gee and Mr. Jones, and there were 
no denials by protestant of the specific statements as 
to the actual transactions involved herein. 
~S;TATEMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in making the following Find-
ings of Fact for the reason that they are contrary to 
and against the evidence : Finding of Fact No. 4 that 
Alma Gee had the protestant sign the "Assignment", 
Exhibit 6; th-at there was no consideration for said 
''Assignment'' ; that Edward C. Behm did not fully 
comprehend the import or the contents of said'' Assign-
ment''; that he had not been fully and completely in-
structed as to his rights in said matter; also Findings 
9, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 and 16. 
2. That .the court erred In making Findings of 
Fact Nos. 8, 9, 12, 13, 15 and 16 for the further reason 
that each of them is surplusage, and redundant, and 
irrelevant, and not within the issues. 
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3. That the court erred in n1aking the following 
Conclusions of La"r for the reason that the same are 
not supported by the evidence and are against and con-
trary to the la'v: Conclusion of L.aw No. 1 that the 
right of action for the death of V enna Darlene Behm, 
deceased, was at no time subject to probate; Conclu-
sion of Law No.2 that Exhibit 6, the "Assignment" of 
Edward C. Behm to Alma Gee, is void and of no effect; 
Conclusion of Law No. 3 that there was no consideration 
for the "Assignment", Exhibit 6, and that the said 
"Assignment" was "champerty" and, therefore, void; 
Conclusion of Law No. 4 that because the protestant 
does not require or need any of the recovery and be-
cause of the condition of arrested development and the 
needs of the minor children, the said Edward C. Behm, 
protestant therein, is not entitled to any part of the 
recovery; ConclusioD: of Law No. 5 that Alma Gee, ap-
pellant herein, is not entitled to anything by reason of 
the said "Assignment", Exhibit 6, and that the said 
Alma Gee is only entitled to the sum of $750.00 for all 
his services in this case, the guardianship case and the 
case against the doctor, and that $750.00 is payment in 
full to him for all his services and costs herein and in 
said matters; C.onclusion of Law No. 7 that the attor-
neys for Edward C. Behm are entitled to an order 
directing · the Clerk of the Court to turn over to them 
$500.00 for their services in this matter; Conclusion of 
Law No. 8 that the balance· of the recovery, $10,000.00, 
should be distributed to the guardian of the minors in 
the amount of $5,000.00 to each minor. 
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4. That the court erred in entering judgement al-
lowing the administrator, Alma Gee, only the sum of 
$750.00. 
5. That the· court erred in entering judgement in 
favor of C. Vern on Langlois and Ray S. McCarty for 
$500.00. 
6. That the court erred in entering judgement that 
the $10,000.00 be divided equally between the two 
minors. 
7. That the court erred in holding the ''Assign-
ment" Exhibit '6. void. 
' 
8. That the court erred in refusing to distribute 
.the money herein equally between Alma Gee and the 
·two minors after the payment of attorneys' fees and 
other legitimate expenses. 
9. That the court ·erred in refusing to recognize 
and give effect to the ''Assignment'', Exhihit 6. 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS 
The Findings of Fact in this matter are rather 
weird. Instead of presenting a dispassionate consider-
ation of the testimony such as should characterize ju-
dicial action, they manifestly reflect an attitude of bias 
and vengeance wholly outside of the issues and not 
sup·ported in any respect by the evidence. The trial 
court was obviously controlled by a situation that arose 
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in court, long after the relevant act8 in this n1atter had 
occurred. This situation had nothing 'vhatever to do 
with the solution of the legal problems involved in this 
matter~ no relevancy at all in the proper solution of the 
problems before the court for solution. The incident 
've have related of the adn1inistrator 'vithdrawing the 
money from the bank and then being required to pro-
duce it in court and deposit it '\vith the Clerk of the 
Court has no possible bearing on the issues in this 
matter. It was a matter wholly unconnected with the 
completed transactions between Behm and Gee and the 
case against the doctor, and yet that incident alone· 
could account for the hodge-podge of irrelevant denun-
ciations appearing throughout the Findings of Fact. 
Actually there is no finding or attempt to make a 
finding or conclusion of fraud, one of the main issues. 
In addition, the findings that the administrator, appel-
lant here, was not a credible witness, was wilfully dere-
lict in his duty; that he cannot be trusted with the 
money; that the testimony given by him and his wit-
nesses is not to be relied up·on, have no bearing upon 
the issues here. Also the trial court finds that the 
husband, Behm, was grief-stricken and upset, although 
what relevency this has to the case doesn't appear; 
that he had full confidence and trust in Gee, and why 
not-Gee did a good job, he did not deceive or attempt 
to deceive Behm; that Behm had not been fully in-
structed in his rights, with no finding that anyone had 
any duty to instruct him; that Gee did not say any-
thing concerning the contents of the ''Assignment'' nor 
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attempt to explain the contents, when the record is un-
disputed that Gee insisted on Behm reading the ''As-
signment", made no representations whatever about it, 
and Behm did read the ''Assignment'', and the ''As-
signment'' is here in evidence and demonstrates that 
any school boy upon reading it would understand it; 
that Gee posted two nominal bonds, when it appears 
without contradiction that he posted the only bonds 
ever required of him~ that Gee did not keep B·ehm in-
formed of the action against Holbrook, when Gee was 
under no duty to do so; that $500.00 should be paid to 
Behm's attorneys, when they completely failed to se-
cure anything sought by them in their petitions-$1,-
600.00 for Behm in expense 1noney and to split the 
balance of the recovery between Behm and the children. 
This Behm sought both in his petition for an order to 
show cause, (Tr. 18), and in his objections to the peti-
tion for distribution, (Tr. 38, 41). The trial court 
further finds that Ge·e did not perform all of his duties 
in the face of the undisputed fact that without Gee's 
efforts there would not have been one cent recovered 
in this cas·e, and that there is now on deposit with the 
Clerk of this Court $10,500.00 for distribution to those 
entitled to it, including the babies, which would not 
have been available except for Gee. The only purpose 
of the whole controversy was to recover for the death 
of Venna Darlene Behm, and that recovery has been 
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accomplished through the efforts of Aln1a Gee and his 
attorney and no one else. Not one din1e did this pro-
testant ever secure or atteinpt to secure for the benefit 
of his children on account of the death of his \vife. 
The trial court found that the ''Assignment'' was 
''champertous''. There was no issue of champerty 
and no issue of no consideration for the assignment 
presented by the protestant's objections in this case. 
They \vere the ·contributions of the trial court in an 
effort to punish Gee, not for any dereliction of duty 
in collecting for the benefit Df the heirs, but solely be-
cause of the episode above related in bringing the money 
into court. Champerty was neither proved nor pleaded, 
and as we shall point out, it must be pleaded in order 
to be a defense. 
The legal propositions involved in this case fall 
roughly under two headings, the first of which in turn 
is divisible into 4 sub-headings : 
I. The Validity of the "Assignment", Exhibit 6. 
(A) Assignability of Behm's Share of any Re-
covery. 
(B) There was no fraud on the part of Gee in 
Connection with the ''Assignment''. 
(C) Consideration for the ''Assignment''. 
(D) Is the "Assignment'' Champertous~ 
II. Distribution and Proportions of Distribution of 
the Recovery. 
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1. THE VALIDITY OF THE ''ASSIGNMENT'', EX-
HIBIT 6. 
(A) Assignability of B~ehm's Share 
·of any Recovery. 
The entire argument of counsel below was based 
upon the three decisions in Johanson vs. CucJ.ahy Pack-
ing Compa;n;y, 100 Utah 399, 115 Pac. (2) 794, 101 Utah 
219, 120 Pac. (2) 281, and 107 Utah 114, 152 Pac. (2) 
98. These decisions were relied upon by opposing coun-
sel upon the basis that this court is committed to the 
doctrine that a cause of action for death is non-assign-
able. These decisions have no bearing whatever upon 
the p-roblem with which we are concerned here. There 
was no assignment of any cause of action for death in 
this case. There was no attempt to assign the cause 
of action for the death of Venna Darlene Behm, de-
ceased. 
Our statute, Sectio~ 104-3-11, U.C.A. 1943 so far 
as pertinent provides a.s follows: 
'' * * * when the death of a person not a 
minor is caused by the wrongful act or neglect 
of another, his heirs, or his personal represen-
tatives for the benefit of his heirs, may main-
tain an action for damages against the p·erson 
causing the death, * * *. In every action under 
this and the next preceding section such dam-
ages may be given as under all the circumstances 
of the case may be just.'' 
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The cause of action \vas not assigned. The cause of 
action "~as brought by .... >\.lma Gee, administrator of the 
estate of \""enna Darlene Behm, for the benefit of "Ven-
na Julene Behm and Cheryl Darlene Behm, who to-
gether with deceased's husband, Edward Behm, con-
stitute the heirs of said deceased.'' The complaint 
also alleges ''that as a result of the negligence and 
carelessness as aforesaid the said heirs of said ''de-
ceased'' were damaged. Edward c .. Behm did not as-
sign his cause of action. He petitioned the court to 
appoint Alma Gee as his representative, and upon his 
petition Alma Gee was ap,pointed the personal repre-
sentative for all the heirs and brought the cause of 
action as the personal rep=resentative. The cause of 
action was brought exactly as the statute says it should 
be, by the personal representative for the benefit of 
the heirs. The ''Assignment'' assigned all of Behm 's 
''right, title, claim and interest in and to the said estate·, 
the proceeds thereof, and particu~arly the proceeds of 
any ~reoovery made ior reoovered from V~on G. H~olbrotok 
or any recovery made or recov,ered for the death of 
said deceased." We have found no case holding that 
an heir may not make an assignment of his share as 
an heir. The argument is made that this claim is not 
an asset of an estate, and in the striet sense of the 
term that is true. However, all the authorities includ-
ing this court hold that it is a sufficient asset of the 
estate for the appointment in probate of an adminis-
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trator. Mr. Justice McCarty, In-re Lowh).am's Estat.e, 
30 Utah 43.6, 441, 85 Pac. 445, says 
''While a claim for ·damages for death by wrong-
ful act is not a general asset of the estate under 
the foregoing provisions of the Wyoming -stat-
utes, we think it is a s.ufficient asset of the es-
tate for the purpose of appointing an adminis-
trator. This court, in effect, so held in the case 
of In-re Estate of Tasanen, 25 Utah 396, 71 Pac. 
984. The doctrine declared in that case is not 
only in harmony with a great weight of authori-
ty, but is, we think, supported by the better 
reason.'' · 
The Wyoming statute is of similar import to our own. 
In fact this court in line with all the authorities has 
held that while an heir may not bind the estate, he may 
nevertheless bind any interest he may have, and that 
while he may not compromise a claim against the es-
tate, he may bind himself or any interest he has in the 
estate, D11A1in vs. Wallingford, 47 Utah 491, 500, 155 
Pac. 347. And In-re Z·uniga vs. Evans, 87 Utah 198, 
48 Pac. (2) 513, this court held in line with all the 
authorities that a pe-rson with a cause of action for 
tort has sufficient interest to constitute him a creditor 
of the tort feasor so that he may follow the p~roperty 
of the tort feasor into the hands of a grantee in the 
event he recovers judgement against the tort feasor. 
In other words, by virtue of the fradulent conveyance 
statute, 33-1-1, Behm was a creditor of the doctor who 
caused his wife's death, a creditor being a person hav-
ing a claim whether matured or unmatured, liquidated 
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or unliquidated, and as such creditor he had a property 
right even though his claim was unliquidated. In Zuniga 
vs. Evans the defendant ~s conveyance of his property 
made prior to judgment against him in a tort action 
\vas set aside in favor of the plaintiff in the tort action . 
.. A.s a matter of practice heirs are constantly assigning 
interests in their recovery under the death statute . 
. A ..ttorneys, as was the case in this action, take the case 
on a contingent fee basis, that is the heirs assign a 
proportion of their interest in the recovery to the at-
torney as a consideration for bringing the action. This 
was early sustained in this court as proper. In-re 
Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac. 217. That was a death 
case wherein the heirs retained the attorneys on a con-
tingent fee of 50% of whatever amount might he re-
covered in the action. This court held that this was 
entirely legal and proper, citing former Utah cases 
''where it was held by this court that contracts for 
contingent fees, based on a moiety of the amount of 
recovery, are lawful.'' 
The cause of action here was not assigned but was 
brought for the benefit of the heirs by the personal 
representative. One of the heirs assigned his interest 
in the recovery. He did not assign his cause of action 
but authorized the cause of action to be brought by the 
personal representative for the benefit of all the heirs. 
The heir was a creditor of the doctor, and he assigned 
the amount of his debt to Mr. Gee, and the cause 'of 
action was maintained as the statute requires. In any 
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event Behm should not be allowed to question the ''As-
signment'' after Gee has fully performed. 
(B) Ther-e ·was no Fram,d on the part of Gee in 
c·oVJ'IIrt.ectiorn with the ''Assignment''. 
There is not one word in the record that would 
support a finding that Gee procured the "Assignment" 
fraudulently. There is no Finding of Fact or Conclusion 
of Law that the ''Assignment'' was procured by fraud, 
and yet fraud and the non-assignability of the cause 
of action were the only issues actually raised by the 
protestant. Gee was appointed administrator on Behm's 
petition because Behm according to his own statement 
didn't care to act and because Behm according to the 
overwhelming weight of the evidence refused to act be-
cause he thought it was useless and there could be no 
recovery against the doctor. Before Gee was appointed 
administrator, Behm assigned his right in any recovery 
to Gee upon consideration that Gee would carry for-
ward the proceedings, and particularly for the benefit 
of Behm's minor children. Before Gee was appointed 
administrator, Behm had ceased to have any right to 
any recovery for himself. His only concern thereafter 
was that Gee should proceed diligently with the action 
against the doctor in order that Behm's minor children 
could receive their proper share of anything recovered 
on account of the death of their mother. Behm pro-
tests that he didn't know what the "Assignment" was. 
He admits, howev·er, that he read it. It also appears 
that he did know he had a shar'e in any recovery. 
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He said ( Tr. 112) ''I ""as assigning my share over I 
figured • • ,. . '' The ~ • Assignment'' consists of only 
16 lines and in addition to stating clearly that Behm 
assigns all of his interest in any recovery to be made 
for the death of his wife, it expressly provides that 
said nrinor children shall receive their full share free 
and clear of this assignment. Words could not more 
clearly indicate not only that Behm was assigning his 
share of the recovery but that there was a share aside, 
additional and apart from his that belonged to the chil-
dren, and that the assignment of his share should in 
no way affect their share. As a matter of fact, Behm 
does not deny Mr. Gee's testimony, (Tr. 205), that Behm 
wasn't even going to read the "As-signment" until Mr. 
Gee insisted that he should. There is not one word in 
the record that Mr. Gee misrep-resente-d the contents of 
the- ''Assignment'' to Behm. As a matter of fact, Behm 
was clearly advised at the conference in Mr. Jones' 
office on April11, 1947, that he was taking himself com-
pletely out of the picture, a!ld at that time he- stated 
that he didn't want anything to do with the case, and 
that he understood that he was out of it. Also at that 
conversation Behm was told that Mr. Gee \Vas not will-
ing to proceed without the assignment to him, (Tr. 183). 
Behm understood thoroughly that Mr. Gee was not 
willing to assume all the burden and then have Behm 
reap the fruits of his., Gee's, efforts when Behm him-
self wouldn't do anything at all in the matter. At the 
time the '' .. A.ssignment'' was made Behm was convinced 
that the whole matter was a fruitless undertaking; that 
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there would he no recovery, and he was not willing to 
undertake any part of it. It needs no citation of author-
ity that fraud must be proved by evidence that is clear 
and convincing, and that mere suspicion is not e~ough. 
Not only is there no clear and- convincing evidence, but 
there is no evidence whatever of fraud on the part of 
Mr. Gee. Behm executed the "Assignment" without 
any urging or misrepresentations whatever on the part 
of Gee. We submit none of the things that the Court 
round preceding the ''Assignment'' are sufficient to 
even infer fraud. The court found that Behm read the 
''Assignment", signed the "Assignment" in order that 
the action against the doctor might be commenced. 
That's true, because Gee wasn't willing. to go ahead 
and then have Behm reap 'the fruits of his labors. There 
is no finding of fraud, and there certainly is no evidence 
of fraud. As a matter of fact, counsel for Behm rather 
over-reached themselves in preparing the Findings of 
Fact. In finding No. 2 they proposed this sentence ·as 
to 'vhat preceded the execution of the "Assignment": 
''That said Alma Gee, the administrator herein, eyen 
proposed to the protestant that they go into a partner-
ship for the purpose of commencing suit against the 
doctor." The court struck out the word "even", but 
it found that Gee proposed the alleged p-artnership. The 
only place that this evidence ap,pears in the record is 
from the testimony of Mr. G·ee himself, (Tr. 203). The 
court, however, exp·ressly finds that. Mr. Gee ''was not 
a credible witness", (Tr. 59, finding No. 9) ; "that the 
evidence given by Mr. Gee is not to be relied upon", 
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(Tr. 61). It was credible, however, and was to be re-
lied upon 'vhen the court came to make a finding against 
~Ir. Gee, and in the conversation concerning the part-
nership )fr. Gee was urging Behm to take action and 
Behm insisted that there was no use suing a doctor, 
''they have got a fence around them with the law, and 
you can't get in.''* * • (Gee) ''so I wanted him to go 
in on it. I said, 'let's go in partners, Ed,' and he said, 
"No, I don.'t want anything to do with that at all'." 
(Tr. 203). It is impossible to conceive how Mr. Gee 
could propose a partnership with Mr. B-ehm in some-
thing that Behm had no interest in so when the court 
found that l\Ir. Gee proposed a p~artnership with Behm 
before the "Assignment" was made, the court by that 
finding inadvertently also found not only that Gee 
was insisting to Behm that he did have some rights 
and that he share those rights with Gee, but also that 
Behm if he didn't know about them before, learned 
about them at that conversation and still refused to 
proceed. By that finding the court as a necessary re-
sult thereof found that instead of misrepresenting to 
Behm, Gee told Behm of his rights and .wanted to share 
them, and Behm knew all about them and refus·ed-not 
to share them, but to exercise them -at all, and that he 
later assigned all those rights to Gee. 
If authorities were necessary to demonstrate that 
there is no basis to even consider the question of fraud, 
we refer this court to its language in Kelly vs. S~alt Lake 
Transportati;on C~ompany, 100 Utah 436, 116 Pac. (2) 
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383, wherein at page 441 of the Utah Reports this court 
quotes the Pennsylvania court with approval as follows: 
"It has been more than once held that it is error 
to submit a question of fraud to the jury upon 
slight parole evidence to overturn a written in-
strument. The evidence ·of fraud must be clear, 
precise and indubitable; otherwise it should be 
withdrawn from the jury.'' 
(C) 0-onsideraxtion for the '' As~ignm.ent'' 
The court found that there was no consideration for 
the ''Assignment.'' This we do not desire to discuss 
at length. There was no issue of lack of consideration. 
If counsel have any cases to support such a finding in 
the face of this record, we will be deeply interested to 
read them and will then respond to them. The ''Assign-
ment" recites and the r·ecord shows that ·Gee .had insti-
tuted proceedings for the recovery for the death of the de-
ceased. The record shows that these p~roceedings we-re 
instituted at the instance and petition of Behm. The 
''Assignment'' then provides that Gee will continue to 
carry on the procee-dings for recovery, and particularly 
for the benefit of Behm's minor children, and in con-
sideration for so doing, Behm assigns his share of the 
proceeds of the recovery. Gee performed and carried 
on _proceedings and recovered for the benefit of the minor 
children, and they now have available several thousand 
dollars each as a result. Behm made a contract that he 
would give Gee something if Gee would do something 
in return for Behm's children. Gee has done that, and if 
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there are any cases that say that that is not a valid 
consideration for the '• .. A.ssign1nent, '' \Ve confess we are 
not fruuiliar "ith them. 
(D) Is the •• .Assignment'' Champertous? 
The court found that the ''Assignment'' was. champ-
ertous. This, as we have already indicated, was the 
court's own idea. Counsel had already called Mr. Gee 
everything they could think of and charged him with 
every applicable crime so the court added his contribu-
tion overlooked by counsel, to the picture and found 
champerty. It is elementary that champerty is an affir-
mative defense which must be pleaded and p~roved by the 
person interposing it, 10 Am. Jur., Sec. 36, page 577. 
The protestant did not plead champerty, and there is no 
evidence of champerty. This court speaking through 
Judge. McCarty, the father of one of protestant's counsel, 
in the case of In-re Evans, supra, 42 Utah 282, had the 
following to say at page 335 : 
"But few rules of the common law have 
undergone more sweeping changes in their ap-
plication than those relating to maintenance and 
champerty.'' 
And on page 337 quoting from 1 Page on Contracts who 
in turn quotes from Blackstone, Judge McCarty approves 
the following language: 
'' 'A man may, however, maintain the suit 
of his near kinsman, servant, or poor neighbor 
out of charity and compassion, with impunity,' 
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and adds: 'A parent may supply his daughter 
with funds to sue, as for breach ·of promise and 
seduction. So it is not maintenance for a wife 
to aid her husband'." 
This is in line with the great weight of authority as 
pointed out by Judge McCarty. As a matter of fact, it 
is extremely. doubtful if it would lie in the mouth of 
Behm to raise the defense of champ·erty. There is a de-
cided conflict in the decisions and many courts hold that 
one· cannot plead champerty as a defense to an assign-
ment, ~hen he. has received all the benefits contemplated 
under- the assignment, 10 Am. Jur., ~sec. 29', page 572. Not 
only is champerty a gratuitous issue injected into the 
case by the court and not the parties, but there is no 
evidence whatever in this case of champerty. Mr. Gee, 
as he had a perfect right to do, was proceeding for re-
. ·' ' 
covery of the death of his daughter for the benefit of her 
' -
heirs including his own grandchildren. As stated by the 
North Carolina Supreme Court forty years ago in Smith 
vs. Hartsel, 63 S.E. 172: 
- "There is much reason, it thus s-eems., for the 
relaxation of the old doctrines pertaining to the 
subject, so th~t they may be adapted to the new 
order of things in the present-highly progres-
sive and commercial age. Necessity and justice 
have, accordingly, forced the establishing of rec-
ognized exceptions to the doctrine of these of-
fenses. Among these may be enumerated the 
following instances: Relation by blood and mar-
riage will often justify parties m giVIng each 
other assistance in lawsuits ; '' 
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~either counsel nor the court thought of accusing Mr. 
Gee of being a Communist or a foreign agent or a So-
cialist, or likely "Te would be discussing those matters 
too. It 'vould have been just as relevent to make suc.h 
findings as it 'Ya.s to make the findings that the court 
did make. This case is an illustration of the depressing 
results of injecting spleen and bias into judicial pro-
nouncements. 
II. DISTRIBUTION AND PROPORTIO·NS OF DIS-
TRIBUTION OF THE RECO·VERY. 
Regardless of what recognized rule is followed in 
the distribution of the recovery, there are no cases sup-
porting the method used by the trial court. Neither rea-
son nor authority supports the judgment of the lower 
court. 
There is no uniform rule governing the distribution 
of the proceeds received as recovery for wrongful death. 
The matter is entirely controlled by the statutes of the 
various states. Many of them are patterned under Lord 
Campbell's Act and none of them that we have found is 
identical with our own death statute, 104-3-11. This court 
so far as we have been able to determine has not passed 
directly upon the question of distribution, although there 
dre several cases in this court using language which 
would indicate that the statute of distribution in probate 
controls. This would seem not only reasonable but re-
quired by the wording of our statute. The statute pro-
vides that if the personal representative brings the ac-
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tion, it is brought for the benefit of the heirs, or the heirs 
may bring the action for their own benefit. There is no 
exclusion of any heir. There is nothing in the statute to 
authorize the court to favor one heir over another. 
As Judge McCarty pointed out in the early case, 
ln-re Lowham's Estate, 30 Utah 436, supra, the claim for 
damages is a sufficient asset of the estate for the purpose 
of appointing an administrator. Some of the cases point 
out that while the amount of damages recoverable in 
a death action is controlled by the loss sustained by those 
to whom the statute gives the right of action, that does 
not control the proportions of distribution. All of 
the cases hold that distribution must be made only to 
those designated by the particular statute. Our statute 
says the action may be maintained for the benefit of the 
heirs, and there. is no dis tinction between them. The dam-
ages to be recovered are the total damages sustained by 
reason of the death. In this state the heirs of one who 
dies intestate and leaves a husband or wife and more 
than one child living, share one-third to the surviving 
husband or wife and the remainder in equal shares to 
the children, 101-4-5 ( 1). 
The argument is made In some of the cases that 
r>#l< 
distribution should he made to the heir in proportion to 
the loss he sustained upon the alleged theory that it 
would be unfair to allow recovery for the loss sustained 
and then distribute the sum in accordance with the 
statute of distribution, the theory being that some heirs 
would r~eceive damages awarded for the loss sustained 
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by other heirs. The result of such reasoning has been 
the utmost confusion in the cases. Some statutes allow 
the jury to fix the proportionate amounts of recovery, 
others allow the court to do so, ,y·hile others adhere either 
by statute or in the absence of statute to the doctrine of 
distribution in accordance with the statue of distribution. 
In our state the Legislature has already said that 
the heirs of a p·erson who dies intestate and leaves a 
surviving spouse and more than one child share one-
third to the surviving spouse and the remainder in equal 
shares to the children. Our death statute, 104-3-11, has 
been amended since the original law was enacted in 
1888, but it has not been amended since 1901. The words, 
''for the benefit of his heirs'', in the phrase referring 
to the bringing of the action by the personal representa-
tive were added in 1901. Our succession and distribution 
statute is identical with the statute of 1888 except for the. 
last sentence of sub-division 1 with which W·e are not 
here concerned, which was added as a p~roviso in 1899, 
(See notes following each section in the Code). Always 
the succession statute has provided that the heirs of 
one who dies intestate share in the proportions above 
indicated. The argument of unfairness would apply with 
the same force to this statute as to distribution of death 
proceeds under the distribution statutes, but for sixty 
years and more that has been the method of distribution 
in this state, and under it has become ·established an 
orderly and recognized method of distribution. Had the 
Legislature desired any different method of distribution 
it undoubtedly would have so sp·ecified when the death 
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statute was amended in 1901 to provide that the personal 
representative might bring the action for the benefit of 
the heirs, the heirs of a person dying intestate being those 
designated by the succession statute. 
As above indicated the authorities of other juris-
dictions are of little assistance except as. they announce 
collateral principles helpful in the solution of our pro-
blem. The statement in 16 Am. Jur., Sec. 2'51, page 172, 
is as acceptable and definite as it is possible to make 
under the authorities. That authority points out that 
under Lord Campbell's Act the jury fixed the ·Share of 
the various beneficiaries and that similar provisions are 
found in some of the death statutes in the United States; 
that other statutes di~tribute to certain designated per-
sons in designated proportions, others that the personal 
representative shall distribute the damages as they are 
adjusted between themselves by the. persons taking, 
' I 
oth~rs that the court makes the apportionment in accord-
ance with the age and conditions of the beneficiaries, and 
continuing says: 
. ' . 
"In many, however, if not most, of the statutes, 
although the amount of damages assessed for 
the unlawful killing is required to be based upon, 
and limited to,. the pecuniary loss of certain 
designated p~ersons, it is exp·ressly provided that 
the damages recovered in such an action shall 
be distributed to the statutory beneficiaries in 
the proportions provided by law in relation to 
the distribution of personal p:rop·erty left by 
person dying intestate." (Sec. 251, supra, citing 
cases from some 18 states and the District of 
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Colmnbia). • ., 'The statute of distribution appli-
cable to decedents' estates is also frequently 
used as a guide in maJ\:ing the distribution of 
the damages recovered where there is no man-
datory statutory provision in regard to the ap-
portionment.'' 
One jurisdiction only, to-'vi t: California, in the case of 
ln-re Riccomi, 197 Pac. 97, is cited as authority that dis-
tribution when not fixed by statute shall be on the basis 
of the pecuniary loss sustained by the distributees. 
None of the cases support the method used by the 
trial court in this case in the judgment making distri-
bution. 
We shall call the court's attention to the Utah cases 
after making reference to a few of the decisions from 
other jurisdictions. The decisions from other jurisdic-
tions in some instances consider the Federal Employers' 
Liability Act under which the jury may but is not re-
quired to proportion the damages as is required under 
Lord Campbell's Act. See Central Vermont R. Co. vs. 
White, (1904), 238 U. S. 507, 59 L. Ed. 1433, 35 S. C. R. 
865. Our death statute is not the same as either of those 
acts. 
Three of the New York cases have some points of 
interest. Re Aronowitz, 272 N. Y. S. 421, (Surrogate) 
(1934), is a case where the wife was killed, as in the case 
at bar, and she was survived by her husband eighty years 
old and two children by a former marriage. During the 
pendency of the action the husband died. The settlement 
for the wife's death was $4,000.00. It was claimed that 
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the amount should be divided three ways, one share 
to the husband and one each to the two children. The 
wife's children wanted it all. The court held in line 
with all the authorities that the amount must be dis-
tributed in accordance with the law which created the 
action. Those persons who are entitled to the money 
have a vested prop~erty right from the moment the statu-
tory cause of action accrues. This is in line with the 
proposition we heretofore advanced under I (A) that 
Behm had a prop,erty right which he could assign. The 
New York court says that the cause of action is not 
terminated by the death of the statutory distributee but 
becomes an asset of his estate, so the husband's heirs are 
entitled to his share. The amount to be recovered for 
the death of the wif.e is the total pecuniary loss suffered 
by the entire class, but is distributable not in proportion 
to the respe·ctive losses ·but in accordance with a fixed 
formulae of the statute of distribution. The New York 
statut.e provided that the amount recovered should be 
distributed in accordance ·with the statute of distribu-
tion, ·so one-third went to each of the husband and the 
two children. Re Klein, 295 N. Y. S. 197, (Surr.) (1937), 
is a case where the survivors were a wife and two minor 
children, and the New York court again said that their 
rights were controlled entirely by statute. The statute 
involved in that case was a federal statute that provided 
that the distribution is in p·roportibn to the loss suffered. 
The court figured from the mortality tables, the ex-
pectancy of the wife and her deceased husband, the 
length of time until the son and the daughter arrived 
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at their majority or a period of earning capacity and 
1nade distribution upon that basis. And In"""re Nelson, 
5 N. Y. S. (2) 398, (Surr.) (1938), the court announced 
another well known rule that there is an absolute pre-
sumption that the "ife and children suffer pecuniary loss. 
In that case the court distributed the recovery in ac-
cordance with the mortality tables for the wife and the 
length of minority left for each of the children. 
On the contrary Arkansas in Farulkner vs. Farulkwe!r, 
57 S. W. (2) 818, (1933), says age and ·exp·ectancy is not 
the test of loss. And the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
in G.aydos vs. D~omabyl, 152 A. 549, says that Pennsyl-
vania law requires distribution in accordance with pe-
cuniary loss and then defines pecuniary loss as synony-
mous with pecuniary advantage including s-ervices to be 
expected but not including physical pain, medical or 
other expenses. 'Such expenses could only be recovered 
by virtue of another sp·ecial statute. The loss to the 
husband, say the Pennsylvania court, by the death of 
his wife are her services as a wife, less maintenance, 
etc. Loss of a mother to the children is tender solicitude, 
the teaching of frugality, industry, usefulness, and the 
loss to all of them is in the managem·ent of the house-
hold, buying food and clothing, washing, cooking and 
general care, and that this loss can ·extend as to the 
children beyond minority, this in contradistinction to 
the New York cases above cited. 
The New Jersey case of Wellbrook vs. Ocean Co. T.r. 
C·o., 154 A. 521 (1931), involved the widow and adult 
children by a former marriage. The widow claimed that 
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the adult children suffered no loss. The court said they, 
the adult children, were entitled to their share, citing 
the case of Snedeker vs. Snedeker, a leading New York 
case, in 58 N .E. 4 (1900). 
We cite without extended comment Foster vs. 
Hiaks, 46 So. 533 (Miss.) (1908), where all the damages 
for death are distributed to wife and children equally; 
Throgmorton vs. Allerw~orth, 230 S.W. 967. (Tenn.) 
(1921), where the cause ofaction goes to the widow or the 
personal representative for the benefit of the widow and 
next of kin to be distributed as personal p•roperty, and 
in which case the court said the expense of supporting 
the children cannot be charged against their share of 
the recovery, as was attempted to be done in the case 
at bar; Goltr.a vs. Peop~le, 53 Ill. 224 (1870) where the 
widow refused to account to the children of her husband 
by a former marriage, and it was held that she must 
account to them for two-thirds of the amount r·eceived. 
She contended that the money was not a part of the es-
tate, and the court said· that it might be true that it 
could not be attached by creditors but the administratrix 
got it in her representative capacity and must account to 
the children; another · ·Pennsylvania case, Allison vs. 
Powers, 36 A. 333 (1897), where the husband was killed 
and the wife claimed the fund for herself and her chil-
dren as against the two children of her husband by a 
prior marriage who _were self-supporting. The court 
said that was immaterial since the statute required dis-
tribution under the laws of the intestacy, so while pe-
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cuniary loss might govern the recovery, it did not govern 
the distribution. 
In the Indiana case of D·u.z.a,.n vs. 111 eyers, 65 N.E. 
1046 (1903) the statute provided that the damages re-
covered for death shall be for the exclusive benefit of 
the widow and children to be distributed in the same 
manner as personal property. The widow claimed that 
she was entitled to the entire amount of recovery be-
cause one son of the decedent, a minor, was living with 
other people who were supporting him, and that another 
child was 28 years old and had also been living with other 
persons. It also appeared that the widow had remarried. 
The Indiana appellate court, however, held that the ae-
tion for damages for death was entirely controlled by 
statute and that while recovery must be for pecuniary 
loss sustained, the law implies a substantial pecuniary 
loss in some amount to the wife and the children biJ 
the death of the husband, and that even though the chil-
dren had been emancipated they nevertheless were not 
precluded from recovery since pecuniary is not used 
only in the sense of money or property but looks to 
prospective advantage. The court further said that 
cases holding that only beneficiaries who can show a pe-
cuniary loss are entitled to recover are not cases in which 
a wife and child are the claimants. A wife and child are 
presumed to suffer a pecuniary loss. The Supreme Court 
of Oklahoma in the case of Tackett vs. Tackett, 50 Pac. 
(2)· 293 (1935 ), held that the law implies a substantial 
loss to a minor child regardless of whether the deceased 
had supported it or not. That is also the rule in this 
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state. In Oklahoma the jury may make an apportion-
ment, and if the jury does not do so, distribution is made 
in accordance with the statute of distribution, and where 
the widow recovered a lump sum on behalf of herself 
and deceased's minor children, she was estop~ped to say 
that their respective detriment was otherwise than is 
fixed in the statute of distribution, notwithstanding de-
ceased had not supported his minor child. 
The California case, Re Ricc.omi, 197 Pac. 97, here-
tofore ref-erred to as the only case requiring distribution 
in proportion to the pecuniary loss suffered where the 
statute is silent, decided by the Supreme Court of Cali-
fornia in 1921, considers a case where the wife and a 
mother were the only heirs left by the decedent. The 
Statute in California provides that the action may be 
brought by the heirs or personal representatives and 
contains the same provision as contained in the last sen-
tence of our death statute, to-wit: ''In each action under 
this and the preceding section such damages may be 
given as under all the circumstances of- the case may 
be just.'' The California statute does not contain the 
amendment of 1901 that now appears in our statute, that 
the personal rep~resentative for the benefit of ·the heirs 
brings the action. The California court frankly concedes 
that it does not intend to be bound by the decisions of 
any other state since the California statute has already 
been construed. The original statute in California pro-
vided that the distribution should be in accordance with 
the statute of distribution, and that provision was 
omitted in later enactments. Such is not the situation in 
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this state. In this state we added the words, "for the 
benefit of the heirs'', the words not contained in the Cali-
fornia statute. The California court says how perfectly 
absurd it "\Yould appear to be to hold that the whole 
amount of a recovery giv-en solely on account of the p:e-
cuniary injury to the surviving wife should then go one-
half to the surviving 'vife and one-half to the mother 
who had suffered no pecuniary, injury whatsoever. It 
is just as absurd to do what the court did in this case. 
Becaus-e the husband is able to support himself and 
doesn't need anything from his wife, hold that he suf-
fered no loss and therefore he can get nothing. Carrying 
the argument a step further, the children in the case at 
bar never suffered any loss because they never knew 
their mother and never had her ministrations. The test 
applied by the California court is not the test applied 
by any other state, and pecuniary loss is not so defined 
in any other jurisdiction. How perfectly absurd it would 
be for the court to instruct a jury that although con-
cededly the wife had been killed by the negligence of the 
defendant, the surviving husband and children are not 
entitled to recover anything becaus-e the husband is per-
fectly able to sup·port himself and his children and finan-
cially provide for them all that they need, or to say as 
protestant attempted to have the court say in this cas,e 
that because one child may need more care and attention 
than another, he should get all the money or any sum 
in excess of that given the other child of equal age. The 
loss to all of them, as pointed out by the Pennsylvania 
court, is the same. 
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In this state the rule is establish-ed that the damages 
must be measured as of the moment of death, S"Mi£lds 
vs. Utah Light & Trac·tion Co., 99 Utah 307, 317, 105 Pac. 
( 2) 34 7 ( 1940) . In the concurring portion of his opinion 
Mr. Justice Wolfe said that damage for death ''is to be 
measured as of the time the cause· of action arose-at the 
tim-e of the death due to negligence'', and that events oc-
curring afterwards are immaterial. If it were not· so, 
the defendant might benefit and his negligence be excused 
because of hen·efi.ts that came about subsequent to but 
not consequent on the death it caused. Actually the trial 
court made such a conclusion of law (No. ·1, Tr. 61), and 
then disregarded it entirely in the judgment. The trial 
court held that because it developed after the· death of 
their mother that the children· might need unusual care 
and ·the ·father didn't need anything, that he should·get 
nothing and the children should get it all. The trial 
court might ·just as well have found that ·because· the 
father had to suppbrt the children who would require 
more attention than usual, he should get it all, and they 
should get nothing. Neither proposition is the law. Our 
statute says the cause of action is for the benefit of the 
heirs, and the cases all hold even including California 
that where the survivors are husband or wife and chil-
dren there is a p~resumption of pecuniary. loss. The pro-
testant himself testifi.~d that he was so upset at the time 
of the death of his wife and for months thereafter that he 
didn't want to bring this action. In fact, he testified that 
he was still up~set at the time of the hearing although he 
had remarried in the preceding August. Under the trial 
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court's theory, the protestant's ren1arriage w·ould cut him 
off entirely from any recoYery in spite of the fact that. 
he said he 'vas still upset. 
The fact of the matter is that the protestant at-
tempted by any means available even if it meant dis-
claiming his entire interest in the recovery to prevent 
Mr. Gee from receiving any portion of this recovery. Of 
course this protestant will be perfectly satisfied to have 
all the money go to the children, provided he can have 
Mr. Gee ou~ted as the guardian of their estates, and par-
ticularly if he can get some trust company of his seleC-
tion to become the guardian. We venture the assertion 
that the money will not last five years. The trust com-
pany will make no effort to investigate the childrens' 
needs, and we venture the assertion that if the officers of 
the trust company were interrogated, they would so ad-
mit. They simply would not have the facilities for the 
small amount of fee available in this case to make the 
continuous investigations necessary to meet the on-
slaughts that would be made on this fund. It is not diffi-
cult to envision monthly or other periodic requests for 
allowances in increasingly large amounts, because of the 
alleged infirmities of these babies. To distribute this 
money to a trust company as guardian of the babies is 
the equivalent of distributing the entire fund to the p·ro-
testant, and that Mr. Gee resisted and is still resisting 
with all the vigor possible even to the extent, upon the 
advice of counsel, of withdrawing the money from the 
bank and secreting it. According to his statement which 
is not denied, that was his motive in withdrawing the 
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money from the bank and his reluctance in disclosing 
wher·e it was even upon the urging of the trial court. He 
had fought a long and valiant fight to secure a fund on 
account of the death of his daughter, and he was de-
termined whether erroneously or not to keep that fund 
from coming in any wise under the control of the pro-
testant. 
The only thing in this case that can be charged 
against Mr. Gee is that he withdrew the money from the 
bank and was reluctant to bring it into court for fear 
the, protestant would gain control ov·er it. In every re-
spect he faithfully fulfilled his agreement. He fought the 
fight for his daughter's death for the benefit of her chil-
dren. He recovered for them a substantial sum they 
otherwise would not have had. He bore the burden and 
accounted, we submit, for everything to which the chil-
dren are entitled. 
It is true that this court in Burbidge. vs. Utah Light 
& Ttaction Compam;y, 57 Utah 566, states that recovery 
under our death statute is founded upon a pecuniary loss, 
but it likewise in that case expressly held tha.t pecuniary 
loss included loss of society and comp~anionship and that 
it was error to instruct the jury so as to deprive an heir 
of recovery because there had been no association be-
tween him and the deceased for eighteen months before 
his death. 
In the case of ln-re Evan'tts vs. Q.regon Short Line 
Railroad Co., 37 Utah 431, 108 Pac. 638 (1910), this 
court held that while it is true that the loss under our 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
55 
statute is in a large sense a pecuniary loss, such loss in-
cludes the loss of advice, comfort, society enjoyed p-rior 
to the death of the deceased and which would have con-
tinued, and that even if the deceased did not provid-e 
any mo~ey the heirs would still be entitled to recover 
''because the society of the deceased may have been a 
comfort. and his advice of material assistance to them.'' 
In that case the court exp-ressly said at page 441 of the 
Utah Reports: 
'' * * * the jury should be admonished that in no 
event can the pecuniary necessities or the physi-
cal requirements of the wife or children be con-
sidered for the p~urpose of enhancing the dam-
ages which were caused by the negligent act 
complained of." 
In the case at bar the trial court used the lack of pe-
cuniary necessities of the protestant to eliminate him 
from distribution, and the p·hysical requirements of the 
children to justify giving them the entire recovery. The 
trial court did the thing completely backwards. 
In the case of In-re Evans, 42 Utah 282, 130 Pac.. 
217, heretofore cited on another point, the court points 
out without comment that after payment of attorn·ey's 
fees the probate court paid the balance to the widow 
and children. No question was raised about their neces-
sities or their pecuniary loss sustained. The class, to-wit: 
the heirs of the deceased were given the amount of the 
recovery. In P.armley vs. Ple1aso;nt V:alley Co,al Compa;n;ry, 
64 Utah 125, 228 Pac. 557, (1924), this court discusses 
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our death statute (pp. 128-9 Utah) and points out that 
originally it was taken from the Code of Civil Procedure 
of California and is first found in the laws of Utah of 
1884, and from there was carried into the Compiled Laws 
of Utah in 1888, and from thence into the Revised Stat-
utes of 1898, and that in 1901 it was amended and as 
amended the sections are as now appear in the Code. 
The amendment of 1901 was to add among other things 
the words, ''for the benefit of his heirs.'' The statute as 
amended is set forth on page 128 of the Utah Reports. 
The court says, page 129 : 
''In reading the sections,. by omitting the ital-
icized words one reads them as originally adopted 
from the C-alifornia Code, and with the italicized 
words as they were amended and as they now 
read are in force and effect.'' 
At the bottom of page 132 and the top of page 133 this 
court points out: 
"* * * the action must· be for the benefit of. aU 
the heirs." (Italics added.) 
The court says on page 138 of the Utah Reports: 
"If damages are recovered, each heir is entitled 
to his p~ropo.rtiovnate share whether he was a 
party to the action or not, and, if his share is 
withheld from him, he may always sustain an 
action against his co-heirs for contribution." 
(Italics added.) 
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Obviously, if a heir is entitled to his proportionate share, 
it must be in the proportion that he is an heir, otherwise 
the action would not be for his benefit as an heir. We 
submit that when the statute says, ''for the benefit of all 
the heirs'', it means for their benefit as heirs, and they 
take as heirs and no other way. When the L.egislature 
has said that the heirs are entitled to recover, it should 
not lie in the mouth of the trial court to say that one 
heir shall take and another shall not. In the case of 
Bff"ainard's Cottonwood D·airy, et. al. vs. Industrial C.orm-
mission, et. al., 80 Utah 159, 164, 14 Pac. (2) 212, this 
court says: 
' ' * * • if damages are recoverable, each heir is 
entitled to his pro-rata share 'whether he was 
a party to the action or not, and, if his share 
is withheld from him, he may always sustain 
an action against his co-h-eirs for contribution'.'' 
(Parmley vs. Pleasant Valley Coal Company, 
supra.) 
It being clear that the well established rule is that 
damages recovered for death must be distributed to the 
persons who are designated as the beneficiaries thereof 
by the statute, it follows that the trial court was in error 
in the case at bar in the proportion and method of dis-
tribution. While this court has not squarely passed upon 
the question, it has referred to the amount of the distri-
bution as the proportionate share and the pro-rata share 
and has app·roved the distribution in probate under the 
probate code. While it is of little moment in this case, 
we 1nay remark that until this case we never heard in 
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this state of a distribution in a death case being made 
other than under the provisions of the descent and dis-
tribution statute, except Federal Employer's liability 
cases. 
Under the theory adopted by the court in this case 
the jury might in its lump sum verdict have found one 
heir to sustain a loss in one amount, and the court might 
award that heir a different amount according to the 
views of the court which might not be the same as the 
views of the jury. The orderly procedure is for the re ... 
covery to include the loss sustained under our recognized 
rules which have , repeatedly be·en announced by this 
court. The distribution then should be made to the heirs, 
not one heir, but all the heirs in the proportions that they 
take as heirs, and not in some proportion to be guessed 
at in each case by either court or jury. There is no more 
hardship in such a situation than there is in any other 
probate matter where the h·eirs take as heirs in the pro-
portions stated in the statute, regardless of their neces-
sities or physical infirmities. This court, as we have 
pointed out, has already said that necessities and physi-
cal infirmities have no place and should not be considered 
in death cases. 
As a matter of fact, the settlement in the case at bar 
was made upon the basis of a loss sustained by the pro-
testant. His loss entered into the fixing of the amount 
of the settlement, and the trial court disregarded this 
entirely in the distribution. We submit that there should 
be a fixed and definite rule and that the Legislature by 
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saying that the recovery is for the benefit of the heirs 
meant that they should take as heirs. Then there is no 
uncertainty and there is a fixed method of computation 
for every case and every ease is controlled by a definite 
and certain rule. 
In any event under all the authorities, and even if 
the ''Assignment'' could by some stretch of the imagina-
tion be called champertous, the administrator is entitled 
to a quantum meruit fee for his services. The trial court 
did the anomalous thing of holding that the administra-
tor fraudulently appropriated $750.00 and then gave him 
the $750.00. Not only was the administrator not fraudu-
lent, but on the contrary was diligent, faithful and suc-
cessful, and under any theory he is entitled to be r·eim-
bursed his expenses and a decent amount for creating a 
fund which but for his efforts would not have existed at 
all. He certainly is entitled to the same compensation as 
an attorney because he took the same hazards, did all the 
work of assembling the evidence and carried all the re-
sponsibility. 
ATTORNEYS;' FEES 
We wish it to be expressly noted that we are not 
asking for any attorneys' fees on this appeal, and we 
have purposely not assigned as error the refusal of 
the trial court to allow any attorneys' fees to us. We 
have never received any fees herein or in the guardian-
ship and never would have asked for any in the petition 
for distribution had not the protestant attempted to re-
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cover from the fund all of his ~xpenses, which he was 
not entitled to ge~t from the fund, and a share in addi-
tion when he had done nothing whatever to create it. 
We have already pointed out that Behm is entitled to 
nothing from the fund for his attorneys. He did not 
seek· to protect the children. The children were already 
protecte~, and they would have received their full share 
regardless of anything done by protestant. He failed 
in everything he sought. H·e sought only benefits for him-
self. He has contributed absolutely nothing and has only 
caused delay and exp:ense. 
CONCLUSION 
. We submit that the protestant had a right to assign 
his .s~ar~ in the recovery to any one he desired; that he 
did so freely and voluntarily and with full knowledge of 
what he was doing and for a valid consideration; that 
there was no fraud in securing the ''Assignment'', and 
that the same is in no respects champertous but is valid 
and binding. We submit further that under our death 
statute the heirs. take as heirs and in no other way. The 
amount of the recoveryis fixed according to their losses 
at the time of death, and that the trial court was en-
tirely in error in eliminating the husband as a distribu-
tee in order to defeat the valid ''Assignment'' to Mr. 
Gee; that the trial court was entirely in error in holding 
that the husband gets nothing because he needed nothing, 
and that the children get it all because they need it all; 
that neither the husband's or childrens' necessities nor 
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the childrens' physical condition have anything to do 
'vith the amount of the recovery or the distribution of the 
same. 
The judgment of the trial court should be reversed 
and the trial court directed to distribute $11,250.00, one-
third to Mr. Gee and one-third each to him as guardian 
of the estates of the children, subject to the payment of 
proper costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SHIRLEY P. J.ONES 
LEWIS LARSON 
Att,o"r.neys for Appellant 
AdminJistrat~o~r, Alma Gee 
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